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CALCULATING AN EQUITABLE CROP-SHARE
ARRANGEMENT
Marvin Sartin*
The rental of farmland is widely accepted, and
share rentals are very common. Crop-share renting
provides that the risks of farming be borne by both
the tenant and the landowner. However, the sharing
ratios typical of most areas are deeply rooted in tradi-
tion and may not promote the most equitable ar-
rangements under current conditions.
Farm leases are subject to individual negotiations,
so the terms of individual agreements vary consid-
erably. The freedom to negotiate terms is basic to the
competitive structure of agriculture, and can be used
to maximize efficiency in allocating available land
among tenants. Economic efficiency of allocating land
and equitability to participants are the primary objec-
tives of the method of lease calculation discussed be-
low.
The Equitability Factor
Farmland rental agreements can be structured in
many different ways. An "equitable" or "fair" lease is
somewhat difficult to define because "equitable" is a
subjective term. However, at least two conditions
must be met to achieve an equitable sharing ar-
rangement: (1) assets must receive returns equal to
their economic productivity; and (2) variable inputs
which directly determine yield level must be shared
in the same proportion as the crop. These principles
are basic to equitable share leases.
Today, crop-share rental agreements vary consid-
erably. Over the past several years, the demand for
additional farmland has caused tenants to bid up the
rental price of land. Most increases have come in the
form of concessions to landowners on shared inputs,
not through changes in traditional sharing ratios.
Such actions adversely affect lease equitability.
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For example, traditional crop-share rental ratios
on the Texas High Plains are one-third on feedgrains
and one-fourth on cotton. Concessions to landowners
have resulted in many tenants bearing all variable
costs of the crops and, in extreme cases, repairing,
maintaining or installing fixed assets on the land.
If rent is to be increased, it would be better to
maintain landowner participation in certain variable
inputs and change the sharing ratio to increase the net
return to land. The return to land under average
yields and prices should be directly related to the risk
accepted by the landowner. At one extreme is a cash
lease in which the landowner accepts little risk; at the
other extreme the landowner shares equally with the
tenant in all production costs and accepts much
greater risks. The cash lease price should be lower
than the normal share rent, and full participation
should return even more to the landowner.
In a share lease, crops and shared costs should be
divided on the same basis. The sharing ratio should
be negotiable, and the landowner should share in the
cost of inputs which directly affect crop yield levels.
The identification of such inputs is not difficult.
Fertilizer and insecticides traditionally have been
specified as yield-determining inputs, and in some
irrigated areas a good case for sharing irrigation
operating costs can be made. In the light of increasing
energy costs and the need to maintain efficient irriga-
tion pumping plants, a sharing of irrigation variable
costs or tenant ownership of the entire irrigation sys-
tem is necessary. Tenant ownership of the irrigation
system raises some serious problems and would be
most practical only with long-term rental agreements.
Thus, it seems much simpler to think in terms of
landowner participation in pumping costs.
Additionally, with some crops landowners may
share in some of the harvesting expenses. For exam-
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pIe, landowners pay for their own cotton ginning and
grain drying; many pay for grain hauling; and some
pay their share of harvesting if the crop is custom
harvested.
There are pros and cons of sharing all harvest-
ing costs. Harvesting expenses are not yield-
determining, but they are generally a function of
yield. It is quite reasonable to expect the landowner
to pay charges levied at the delivery point (ginning or
drying), but payment for actual harvesting is more
difficult to assign.
Where custom harvest is used, costs are easily
determined. But if the tenant owns the harvesting
equipment and provides harvesting labor, division of
costs is more difficult. It is not equitable if the land-
owner shares custom harvest costs but not costs in-
curred by a tenant who harvests his own crops. An
alternative would be for the landowner's costs to be
based on custom rates even though the tenant har-
vests his own crops.
The question of sharing harvest costs is a sticky
one. In theory, because they are a function of yield,
they should be shared. And the most reasonable ap-
proach would be on the basis of custom harvesting
rates. However, the problems associated with
negotiating these conditions may outweigh the bene-
fits.
Calculating Sharing Ratio
This discussion has suggested landowner partici-
pation in more of the variable inputs. Ifthe current or
traditional sharing ratio is not altered, this would re-
duce the return to land. However, if the net return to
the landowner is completely negotiable, then, based
on this negotiated return and projected shared ex-
penses, the sharing ratio can be calculated.
The negotiability of the return to land is the basis
of using the crop sharing method described here.
Cropland for rent is a product offered in a free mar-
ket, competing against other land offered for rent.
The lease price (rent) should be determined by the
interaction of landowners and prospective tenants
who bid for the use of this resource. The only value
that rented land has to a tenant is its ability to gener-
ate income (tenant's share) above his production costs
(variable costs plus rent). In a free negotiation, the
tenant would not knowingly pay more for land than it
would return, and the landowner would not likely
accept less than the going rental rate for similar prop-
erty. In this manner, a tendency toward a state of
relative equilibrium is established, provided that ex-
pectations and realizations of yields and prices are
consistent.
The only person who can decide how much he can
afford to pay to rent a particular tract of land is the
operator. For example, if corn land is currently rent-
ing for $100 per acre and tenants continue to operate
land under those conditions, who can say that the
landowner should receive only $75? The market is
paying $100, and that is the rental value of the land. If
$100 is too high, tenants will back off until the price is
reduced to a level they can afford.
Negotiating in a free market situation is an effec-
tive method of pricing land rental, and if a crop share
is desired, it can be calculated from this negotiation.
For example, assume a landowner and tenant agreed
that a reasonable yield expectation for a farm was 140
bushels of corn per acre, that the corn price would be
$2.50 per bushel, and that the negotiated return to
the landowner's fixed resources should be $100 or 40
bushels of corn. However, fertilizer ($35), insecticide
($10), irrigation ($40), and drying ($15) costs would be
shared on the same basis as the crop. The question of
the sharing ratio remains.
Using the following equation, the sharing ratio can
be calculated:
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Here it is calculated that the landowner should
receive 40 percent of the crop and pay 40 percent
of the fertilizer, insecticide, drying and irrigation
operating costs. Such an arrangement would be com-
pletely equitable based on the negotiated 40-bushel
return to the landowner's resources. Remember, this
is the negotiable portion of the rental price.
The above procedure allows those individuals who
use it to freely bargain on lease rates and still have an
equitable sharing arrangement. The values used in
the example are for illustration only, and extreme
care should be exercised in developing your own val-
ues and costs.
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